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Abstract
Studies on the propagation of malware in mobile networks have revealed that the spread of malware can be highly inhomoge-
neous. Platform diversity, contact list utilization by the malware, clustering in the network structure, etc. can also lead to differing
spreading rates. In this paper, a general formal framework is proposed for leveraging such heterogeneity to derive optimal patching
policies that attain the minimum aggregate cost due to the spread of malware and the surcharge of patching. Using Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle for a stratified epidemic model, it is analytically proven that in the mean-field deterministic regime, optimal
patch disseminations are simple single-threshold policies. Through numerical simulations, the behavior of optimal patching policies
is investigated in sample topologies and their advantages are demonstrated.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Worms (self-propagating malicious codes) are a decades-old threat in the realm of the Internet. Worms undermine the network
in various ways: they can eavesdrop on and analyze traversing data, access privileged information, hijack sessions, disrupt
network functions such as routing, etc. Although the Internet is the traditional arena for trojans, spyware, and viruses, the
current boom in mobile devices, combined with their spectacular software and hardware capabilities, has created a tremendous
opportunity for future malware. Mobile devices communicate with each other and with computers through myriad means–
Bluetooth or Infrared when they are in close proximity, multimedia messages (MMS), mobile Internet, and peer to peer
networks. Current smartphones are equipped with operating systems, CPUs, and memory powerful enough to execute complex
codes. Wireless malware such as cabir, skulls, mosquito, commwarrior have already sounded the alarm [1]. It has been
theoretically predicted [2] that it is only a matter of time before major malware outbreaks are witnessed in the wireless
domain.
Malware spreads when an infective node contacts, i.e., communicates with, a susceptible node, i.e., a node without a copy
of the malware and vulnerable to it. This spread can be countered through patching [3]: the vulnerability utilized by the
worm can be fixed by installing security patches that immunize the susceptible and potentially remove the malware from the
infected, hence simultaneously healing and immunizing infective nodes. However, the distribution of these patches burdens
the limited resources of the network, and can wreak havoc on the system if not carefully controlled. In wired networks, the
spread of Welchia, a counter-worm to thwart Blaster, rapidly destabilized important sections of the Internet [4]. Resource
constraints are even more pronounced in wireless networks, where bandwidth is more sensitive to overload and nodes have
limited energy reserves. Recognizing the above, works such as [5], [6] have included the cost of patching in the aggregate
damage of the malware and have characterized the optimal dynamic patching policies that attain desired trade-offs between
the patching efficacy and the extra taxation of network resources. These results, however, critically rely on the homogeneous
mixing assumption: that all pairs of nodes have identical expected inter-contact times. Optimality may now be attained by
policies that constrain the nodes in the same state to take the same action. While this assumption may serve as an approximation
in cases where detailed information about the network is unavailable, studies [2], [7]–[10] show that the spread of malware
in mobile networks can be very inhomogeneous, owing primarily to the non-uniform distribution of nodes. Thus, a uniform
action may be sub-optimal.
We can motivate heterogeneous epidemics in various ways: 1) Proximity-based spread, where locality causes heterogeneity;
2) Software/protocol diversity [11]–[13], which has even been envisioned as a defense mechanism against future threats [11];
3) IP space diversity, e.g., worms that use the IP masks of specific Autonomous Systems (AS) to increase their yield [14]; 4)
Differing clique sizes, especially for epidemics for which there is an underlying social network graph [3], [15]; 5) Behavioral
patterns, specifically how much risky behaviour every agent engages in [16]; 6) Clusters in cloud computing [17]; 7) Technology
adoption, belief-formation over social media, and health care [18]–[22].
Indeed, many works have proposed practical methods to identify, characterize and incorporate such inhomogeneities to more
accurately predict the spread of infection [2], [8], [9], [14], [23]–[25], etc. Relatively few, e.g., [3], [10], [12], consider the
cost of patching and seek to minimize it in the presence of heterogeneous contact processes. The proposed policies in [3],
[10] are heuristic and apply to specific settings. The only paper we could find that provides provably optimal patching policies
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2for heterogeneous networks is [12]. They, however, focus on SIS models and optimize only in the space of static policies
(those that do not vary patching rates over time) therein. Patching performance can be significantly improved if we allow the
patching rates to vary dynamically in accordance with the evolution of the infection. Characterization of the optimal controls
in the space of dynamic and clustered policies has, however, so far remained elusive.
We propose a formal framework for deriving dynamic optimal patching policies that leverage heterogeneity in the network
structure to attain the minimum possible aggregate cost due to the spread of malware and the overhead of patching. We
assume arbitrary (potentially non-linear) functions for the cost rates of the infective nodes. We consider both non-replicative
and replicative patching: in the former, some of the hosts are pre-loaded with the patch, which they transmit to the rest. In the
latter, each recipient of the patch can also forward the patch to nodes that it contacts by a mechanism similar to the spread
of the malware itself. In our model, patching can immunize susceptible nodes and may or may not heal infective nodes. The
framework in each case relies on optimal control formulations that cogently capture the effect of the patching rate controls on
the state dynamics and their resulting trade-offs. We accomplish this by using a combination of damage functions associated
with the controls and a stratified1 mean-field deterministic epidemic model in which nodes are divided into different types.
Nodes of the same type homogeneously mix with a rate specific to that type, and nodes of different types contact each other at
rates particular to that pair of types. The model can therefore capture any communication topology between different groups
of nodes. Above and beyond, it can exploit the inhomogeneity in the network to enable a better utilization of the resources.
Such higher patching efficacy is achieved by allowing the patching controls to depend on node types, which in turn leads
to multidimensional (dynamic) optimal control formulations. We first develop our system dynamics and objectives (§II) and
characterize optimal non-replicative (§III) and replicative (§IV) patching. We then analyze an alternate objective (§V) and
present numerical simulation of our results (§VI).
Multidimensional optimal control formulations, particularly those in the solution space of functions rather than variables,
are usually associated with the pitfall of amplifying the complexity of the optimization. An important contribution of the
paper, therefore, is to prove that for both non-replicative and replicative settings the optimal control associated with each type
has a simple structure provided the corresponding patching cost is either concave or convex. Furthermore, our analysis, using
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, reveals that the structure of the optimal control for a specific type depends only on the nature
of the corresponding patching cost and not on those of other types. This holds even though the control for each type affects
immunization and healing in other types and the spread of the infection in general. Specifically, if the patching cost associated
with the control for a given type is concave, irrespective of the nature of the patching costs for other types, the corresponding
optimal control turns out to be a bang-bang function with at most one jump: up to a certain threshold time (possibly different
for different types) it selects the maximum possible patching rate and subsequently it stops patching altogether. If the patching
cost is strictly convex, the decrease from the maximum to the minimum patching rate is continuous rather than abrupt, and
monotonous. To the best of our knowledge, such simple structure results have not been established in the context of (static or
dynamic) control of heterogeneous epidemics. Our numerical calculations reveal a series of interesting behaviors of optimal
patching policies for different sample topologies.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND OBJECTIVE FORMULATION
In this section we describe and develop the model of the state dynamics of the system as a general stratified epidemic
for both non-replicative (§II-A) and replicative (§II-B) patching, motivate the model (§II-C), formulate the aggregate cost of
patching, and cast this resource-aware patching as a multi-dimensional optimal control problem (§II-E). This formulation relies
on a key property of the state dynamics which we isolate in §II-D. We develop solutions in this model framework and present
our main results in §III and §IV.
Our models are based on mean-field limits of Poisson contact processes for which pathwise convergence results have been
shown (c.f. [26, p.1], [27]).
A. Dynamics of non-replicative patching
A node is infective if it has been contaminated by the malware, susceptible if it is vulnerable to the infection but not yet
infected, and recovered if it is immune to the malware. An infective node spreads the malware to a susceptible one while
transmitting data or control messages. The network consists of nodes that can be stratified into M different types (equivalently,
clusters, segments, populations, categories, classes, strata). The population of these types need not be equal. Nodes of type i
contacts those of type j at rate βij .
For type i, Si(t), Ii(t), and Ri(t) are respectively the fraction of susceptible, infective and recovered states at time t.
Therefore, for all t and all i, we have Si(t) + Ii(t) + Ri(t) = 1. We assume that during the course of the epidemic, the
population of each type is stable and does not change with time.
Amongst each type, a pre-determined set of nodes, called dispatchers, are preloaded with the appropriate patch. Dispatchers
can transmit patches to both susceptible and infective nodes, immunizing the susceptible and possibly healing the infective; in
1Known by other terms such as structured, clustered, multi-class, multi-type, multi-population, compartmental epidemic models, and sometimes loosely as
heterogeneous, inhomogeneous or spatial epidemic models.
3either case successful transmission converts the target node to the recovered state. In non-replicative patching (as opposed to
replicative patching- see §II-B) the recipient nodes of the patch do not propagate it any further.2 Dispatchers of type i contact
nodes of type j at rate β¯ij , which may be different from the malware contact rate βij between these two types. Examples
where contact rates may be different include settings where the network manager may utilize a higher priority option for the
distribution of patches, ones where the malware utilizes legally restricted means of propagation not available to dispatchers, or
ones where the patch is not applicable to all types, with the relevant β¯ij now being zero. The fraction of dispatchers in type
i, which is fixed over time in the non-replicative setting, is R0i , where 0 ≤ R0i < 1.
Place the time origin t = 0 at the earliest moment the infection is detected and the appropriate patches generated. Suppose
that at t = 0, for each i, an initial fraction 0 ≤ Ii(0) = I0i ≤ 1 of nodes of type i are infected; we set I0i = 0 if the infection
does not initially exist amongst a type i. At the onset of the infection, the dispatchers are the only agents immune to the
malware, hence constituting the initial population of recovered nodes. We therefore identify Ri(0) = R0i . In view of node
conservation, it follows that S0i = 1− I0i −R0i represents the initial fraction Si(0) of susceptible nodes of type i.
At any given t, susceptibles of type i may be contacted by infectives of type j at rate βji. We may fold resistance to
infection into the contact rates and so from a modeling perspective, we may assume that susceptibles contacted by infectious
agents are instantaneously infected. Accordingly, susceptibles of type i are transformed to infectives (of the same type) at an
aggregate rate of Si(t)
∑M
j=1 βjiIj(t) by contact with infectives of any type.
The system manager regulates the resources consumed in the patch distribution by dynamically controlling the rate at which
dispatchers contact susceptible and infective nodes. For each j, let the control function uj(t) represent the rate of transmission
attempts of dispatchers of type j at time t. We suppose that the controls are non-negative and bounded,
0 ≤ uj(·) ≤ uj,max. (1)
We will restrict consideration to control functions uj(·) that have a finite number of points of discontinuity. We say that a
control (vector) u(t) =
(
u1(t), . . . , uM (t)
)
is admissible if each uj(t) has a finite number of points of discontinuity.
Given the control u(t), susceptibles of type i are transformed to recovered nodes of the same type at an aggregate rate of
Si(t)
∑M
j=1 β¯jiR
0
juj(t) by contact with dispatchers of any type. A subtlety in the setting is that the dispatcher may find that
the efficacy of the patch is lower when treating infective nodes. This may model situations, for instance, where the malware
attempts to prevent the reception or installation of the patch in an infective host, or the patch is designed only to remove
the vulnerability that leaves nodes exposed to the malware but does not remove the malware itself if the node is already
infected. We capture such possibilities by introducing a (type-dependent) coefficient 0 ≤ piji ≤ 1 which represents the efficacy
of patching an infective node: piji = 0 represents one extreme where a dispatcher of type j can only immunize susceptibles
but can not heal infectives of type i, while piji = 1 represents the other extreme where contact with a dispatcher of type j
both immunizes and heals nodes of type i equally well; we also allow piij to assume intermediate values between the above
extremes. An infective node transforms to the recovered state if a patch heals it; otherwise, it remains an infective. Infective
nodes of type i accordingly recover at an aggregate rate of Ii(t)
∑M
j=1 pijiβ¯jiR
0
juj(t) by contact with dispatchers.
We say that a type j is a neighbour of a type i if βij > 0, and Sj > 0 (i.e., infected nodes of type i can contact
nodes of type j). There is now a natural notion of a topology that is inherited from these rates with types as vertices and
edges between neighboring types. Figure 1 illustrates some simple topologies. For a given topology inherited from the rates
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Fig. 1. Three sample topologies of 5 hotspot regions: linear, star and complete. For instance, nodes of hotspot 1 in the linear topology can only communicate
with nodes of hotspots 1 and 2: they contact nodes of hotspot 1 at rate β11 and nodes of hotspot 2 at rate β12.
{βij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤M} there is now another natural notion, that of connectivity: we say that type j is connected to type i if, for
some k, there exists a sequence of types i = s1 7→ s2 7→ . . . 7→ sk−1 7→ sk = j where type sl+1 is a neighbour of type sl for
1 ≤ l < k. We assume that each type is either initially infected (Ii(0) > 0), or is connected to an initially infected type. We
also assume that for every type i such that R0i > 0, there exists a type j for which β¯ij > 0, i.e., type i can immunize nodes
2This may be preferred if the patches themselves can be contaminated and cannot be reliably authenticated.
4of at least one type, and there exist types k and l for which βki > 0 and βil > 0, Sl(0) > 0, i.e., the infection can spread to
and from that type. (In most settings we may expect, naturally, that βii > 0 and β¯ii > 0.)
Thus, we have:3
S˙i = −
M∑
j=1
βjiIjSi − Si
M∑
j=1
β¯jiR
0
juj , (2a)
I˙i =
M∑
j=1
βjiIjSi − Ii
M∑
j=1
pijiβ¯jiR
0
juj , (2b)
where, by writing S(t) =
(
S1(t), . . . , SM (t)
)
, I(t) =
(
I1(t), . . . , IM (t)
)
, and R0(t) =
(
R01(t), . . . , R
0
M (t)
)
in a compact
vector notation, the initial conditions and state constraints are given by
S(0) = S0  0, I(0) = I0  0, (3)
S(t)  0, I(t)  0, S(t) + I(t)  1−R0. (4)
In these expressions 0 and 1 represent vectors all of whose components are 0 and 1 respectively, and the vector inequalities
are to be interpreted as component-wise inequalities. Note that the evolution of R(t) need not be explicitly considered since
at any given time, node conservation gives Ri(t) = 1 − Si(t) − Ii(t). We henceforth drop the dependence on t and make it
implicit whenever we can do so without ambiguity.
B. Dynamics of replicative patching
In the replicative setting, a recipient of the patch can forward it to other nodes upon subsequent contact. Thus, recovered
nodes of type i are added to the pool of dispatchers of type i, whence the fraction of dispatchers of type i grows from the initial
Ri(0) = R
0
i to Ri(t) at time t. This should be contrasted with the non-replicative model in which the fraction of dispatchers
of type i is fixed at R0i for all t.
The system dynamics equations given in (2) for the non-replicative setting now need to be modified to take into account
the growing pool of dispatchers. While in the non-replicative case we chose the pair
(
S(t), I(t)
)
to represent the system state,
in the replicative case it is slightly more convenient to represent the system state by the explicit triple
(
S(t), I(t),R(t)
)
. The
system dynamics are now governed by:
S˙i = −
M∑
j=1
βjiIjSi − Si
M∑
j=1
β¯jiRjuj , (5a)
I˙i =
M∑
j=1
βjiIjSi − Ii
M∑
j=1
pijiβ¯jiRjuj , (5b)
R˙i = Si
M∑
j=1
β¯jiRjuj + Ii
M∑
j=1
pijiβ¯jiRjuj , (5c)
with initial conditions and state constraints given by
S(0) = S0  0, I(0) = I0  0, R(0) = R0  0, (6)
S(t)  0, I(t)  0, R(t)  0, S(t) + I(t) +R(t) = 1. (7)
The assumptions on controls and connectivity are as in §II-A.
C. Motivation of the models and instantiations
We now motivate the stratified epidemic models (2) and (5) through different examples, instantiating the different types in
each context.
1) Proximity-based spread—heterogeneity through locality: The overall roaming area of the nodes can be divided into
regions (e.g., hotspots, office/residential areas, central/peripheral areas, etc.) of different densities (fig. 1). One can therefore
stratify the nodes based on their locality, i.e., each type corresponds to a region. IP eavesdropping techniques (using software
such as AirJack, Ethereal, FakeAP, Kismet, etc.) allow malware to detect new victims in the vicinity of the host.
Distant nodes have more attenuated signal strength (i.e., lower SINR) and are therefore less likely to be detected. Accordingly,
malware (and also patch) propagation rates βij (respectively β¯ij) are related to the local densities of the nodes in each region
and decay with an increase in the distance between regions i and j: typically βii exceeds βij for i 6= j, likewise for β¯ij . The
same phenomenon was observed for malware such as cabir and lasco that use Bluetooth and Infrared to propagate.
3We use dots to denote time derivatives throughout, e.g., S˙(t) = dS(t)/dt.
52) Heterogeneity through software/protocol diversity: A network that relies on a homogeneous software/protocol is vulnerable
to an attack that exploits a common weakness (e.g., a buffer overflow vulnerability). Accordingly, inspired by the natural
observation that the chances of survival are improved by heterogeneity, increasing the network’s heterogeneity without sacrificing
interoperability has been proposed as a defense mechanism [11]. In practice, mobile nodes use different operating systems and
communication protocols, e.g., Symbian, Android, IOS, RIM, webOS, etc. Such heterogeneities lead to dissimilar rates of
propagation of malware amongst different types, where each type represents a specific OS, platform, software, protocol, etc. In
the extreme case, the malware may not be able to contaminate nodes of certain types. The patching response should take such
inhomogeneities into account in order to optimally utilize network resources, since the rate of patching can also be dissimilar
among different types.
3) Heterogeneity through available IP space: Smartphone trojans like skulls and mosquito spread using Internet or
P2P networks. In such cases the network can be decomposed into autonomous systems (ASs) with each type representing an
AS [14]. A worm either scans IP addresses uniformly randomly or uses the IP masks of ASs to restrict its search domain
and increase its rate of finding new susceptible nodes. In each of these cases the contact rates differ between different AS’s
depending on the actual number of assigned IPs in each IP sub-domain and the maximum size of that IP sub-domain.
4) Heterogeneity through differing clique sizes: Malware that specifically spreads in social networks has been recorded in
the past few years [15]. Examples include Samy in MySpace in 2005 and Koobface in MySpace and Facebook in 2008.
Koobface, for instance, spread by delivering (contaminated) messages to the “friends” of an infective user. MMS based
malware such as commwarrior can also utilize the contact list of an infective host to access new handsets. In such cases
the social network graph can be approximated by a collection of friendship cliques.4 Users of the same clique can be regarded
as the same type with the rate of contact within cliques and across cliques differing depending on the relative sizes of the
cliques.
5) Cloud-computing—heterogeneity through cluster sizes: In cluster (or grid, or volunteer) computing [17], each cluster of
CPUs in the cloud constitutes a type. Any two computers in the same cluster can communicate at faster rates than those in
different clusters. These contact rates depend on the communication capacity of connecting lines as well as the relative number
of computers in each cluster.
6) Clustered epidemics in technology adoption, belief-formation over social media and health care: We now elaborate on the
application of our clustered epidemics model in these diverse set of contexts. First consider a rivalry between two technologies
or companies for adoption in a given population, e.g., Android and iPhone, or cable and satellite television. Individuals who
are yet to choose either may be considered as susceptibles and those who have chosen one or the other technology would
be classified as either infective or recovered depending upon their choice. Dispatchers constitute the promoters of a given
technology (the one whose subscribers are denoted as recovered). Awareness about the technology and subsequent subscription
to either may spread through social contact between infectives and susceptibles (infection propagation in our terminology),
and dispatchers and the rest (patching in our terminology). Immunization of a susceptible corresponds to her adoption of the
corresponding technology, while healing of an infective corresponds to an alteration in her original choice. The stratifications
may be based on location or social cliques, and the control u would represent promotion efforts, which would be judiciously
selected by the proponent of the corresponding technology. Patching may either be replicative or non-replicative depending on
whether the newly subscribed users are enticed to attract more subscribers by referral rewards. Similarly, clustered epidemics
may be used to model belief management over social media, where infective and recovered nodes represent individuals who
have conflicting persuasions and susceptibles represent those who are yet to subscribe to either doctrine. Last, but not least,
the susceptible-infective-recovered classification and immunization/healing/infection have natural connotations in the context
of a biological epidemic. Here, the dispatchers correspond to health-workers who administer vaccines and/or hospitalization
and the stratification is based on location. Note that in this context, patching can only be non-replicative.
D. Key observations
A natural but important observation is that if the initial conditions are non-negative, then the system dynamics (2) and (5)
yield unique states satisfying the positivity and normalisation constraints (4) and (7), respectively. The proof is technical and
is not needed elsewhere in the paper; we relegate it accordingly to the appendix.
Theorem 1. The dynamical system (2) (respectively (5)) with initial conditions (3) (respectively, (6)) has a unique state solution(
S(t), I(t)
)
(respectively
(
S(t), I(t),R(t)
)
) which satisfies the state constraints (4) (respectively, (7)). For all t > 0, Ii(t) > 0;
Ri(t) > 0 if Ri(0) > 0; and Sj(t) > 0 if and only if Sj(0) 6= 0. For each j such that Sj(0) = 0, Sj(t′) = 0 for all t′ ∈ (0, T ].
E. The optimality objective
The network seeks to minimize the overall cost of infection and the resource overhead of patching in a given operation time
window [0, T ]. At any given time t, the system incurs costs at a rate f
(
I(t)
)
due to the malicious activities of the malware.
For instance, the malware may use infected hosts to eavesdrop, analyze, misroute, alter, or destroy the traffic that the hosts
4A clique is a maximal complete subgraph of a graph [28, p. 112].
6generate or relay. We suppose that f(0) = 0 and make the natural assumption that the scalar function f(I) is increasing and
differentiable with respect to each Ii. The simplest natural candidate for f(I) is of the form
∑M
i=1 fi(Ii); in this setting each
fi is a non-decreasing function of its argument representing the cost of infection for type i which is in turn determined by the
criticality of the data of that type and its function.5 The network also benefits at the rate of L
(
R(t)
)
, i.e., incurs a cost at the
rate of −L(R(t)), due to the removal of uncertainty about the state of the nodes being patched. We suppose that the scalar
function L(R) is non-decreasing and differentiable with respect to each Ri.
In addition to the cost of infection, each dispatcher burdens the network with a cost by consuming either available bandwidth,
energy reserves of the nodes (e.g., in communication and computing networks), or money (e.g., in technology adoption,
propaganda, health-care) to disseminate the patches. Suppose dispatchers of type i incur cost at a rate of R0i hi(ui). We
suppose that the overhead of extra resource (bandwidth or energy or money) consumption at time t is then given by a sum of
the form
∑M
i=1R
0
i hi(ui). The scalar functions hi(·) represent how much resource is consumed for transmission of the patch
by nodes of each type and how significant this extra taxation of resources is for each type. Naturally enough, we assume these
functions are non-decreasing and satisfy hi(0) = 0 and hi(γ) > 0 for γ > 0. We assume, additionally, that each hi is twice
differentiable. Following the same lines of reasoning, the corresponding expression for the cost of replicative patching is of
the form
∑M
i=1Rihi(ui).
With the arguments stated above, the aggregate cost for non-replicative patching is given by an expression of the form
Jnon−rep =
∫ T
0
(
f(I)− L(R) +
M∑
i=1
R0i hi(ui)
)
dt, (8)
while for replicative patching, the aggregate cost is of the form
Jrep =
∫ T
0
(
f(I)− L(R) +
M∑
i=1
Rihi(ui)
)
dt. (9)
Problem Statement: The system seeks to minimize the aggregate cost (A) in (8) for non-replicative patching (2, 3) and
(B) in (9) for replicative patching (5, 6) by an appropriate selection of an optimal admissible control u(t).
In this setting, it is clear that by a scaling of β¯ji and hj(·) we can simplify our admissibility conditions on the optimal controls
by supposing that uj,max = 1.
It is worth noting that any control in the non-replicative case can be emulated in the replicative setting: this is because
the fraction of the dispatchers in the replicative setting is non-decreasing, hence at any time instance, a feasible urep(t) can
be selected such that Ri(t)u
rep
i (t) is equal to R
0
i u
non−rep
i (t). This means that the minimum cost of replicative patching is
always less than the minimum cost of its non-replicative counterpart. Our numerical results will show that this improvement
is substantial. However, replicative patches increase the risk of patch contamination: the security of a smaller set of known
dispatchers is easier to manage than that of a growing set whose identities may be ambiguous. Hence, in a nutshell, if there
is a dependable mechanism for authenticating patches, replicative patching is the preferred method, otherwise one needs to
evaluate the trade-off between the risk of compromised patches and the efficiency of the patching.
III. OPTIMAL NON-REPLICATIVE PATCHING
A. Numerical framework for computing the optimal controls
The main challenge in computing the optimal state and control functions
(
(S, I),u
)
is that while the differential equations
(2) can be solved once the optimal controls u(·) are known, an exhaustive search for an optimal control is infeasible as there
are an uncountably infinite number of control functions. Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (PMP) provides an elegant technique
for solving this seemingly intractable problem (c.f. [29]). Referring to the integrand in (8) as ξnon−rep and the RHS of (2a)
and (2b) as νi and µi, we define the Hamiltonian to be
H = H(u) := ξnon−rep +
M∑
i=1
(λSi νi + λ
I
iµi), (10)
where the adjoint (or costate) functions λSi and λ
I
i are continuous functions that for each i = 1 . . .M , and at each point of
continuity of u(·), satisfy
λ˙Si = −
∂H
∂Si
, λ˙Ii = −
∂H
∂Ii
, (11)
along with the final (i.e., transversality) conditions
λSi (T ) = 0, λ
I
i (T ) = 0. (12)
5Such differences themselves may be a source of stratification. In general, different types need not exclusively reflect disparate mixing rates.
7Then PMP implies that the optimal control at time t satisfies
u ∈ arg min
v
H(v) (13)
where the minimization is over the space of admissible controls (i.e., H(u) = minvH(v)).
In economic terms, the adjoint functions represent a shadow price (or imputed value); they measure the marginal worth
of an increment in the state at time t when moving along an optimal trajectory. Intuitively, in these terms, λIi ought to be
positive as it represents the additional cost that the system incurs per unit time with an increase in the fraction of infective
nodes. Furthermore, as an increase in the fraction of the infective nodes has worse long-term implications for the system than
an increase in the fraction of the susceptibles, we anticipate that λIi − λSi > 0. The following result confirms this intuition. It
is of value in its own right but as its utility for our purposes is in the proof of our main theorem of the following section, we
will defer its proof (to §III-C) to avoid breaking up the flow of the narrative at this point.
Lemma 1. The positivity constraints λIi (t) > 0 and λIi (t)− λSi (t) > 0 hold for all i = 1, . . . ,M and all t ∈ [0, T ).
The abstract maximum principle takes on a very simple form in our context. Using the expression for ξnon−rep from (8)
and the expressions for νi and µi from (2), trite manipulations show that the minimization (13) may be expressed in the much
simpler (nested) scalar formulation
ui(t) ∈ arg min
0≤x≤1
ψi(x, t) (1 ≤ i ≤M); (14)
ψi(x, t) : = R
0
i (hi(x)− φi(t)x); (15)
φi : =
M∑
j=1
β¯ijλ
S
j Sj +
M∑
j=1
β¯ijpiijλ
I
jIj . (16)
Equation (14) allows us to characterise ui as a function of the state and adjoint functions at each time instant. Plugging
into (2) and (11), we obtain a system of (non-linear) differential equations that involves only the state and adjoint functions
(and not the control u(·)), and where the initial values of the states (3) and the final values of the adjoint functions (12) are
known. Numerical methods for solving boundary value nonlinear differential equation problems may now be used to solve for
the state and adjoint functions corresponding to the optimal control, thus providing the optimal controls using (14).
We conclude this section by proving an important property of φi(·), which we will use in subsequent sections.
Lemma 2. For each i, φi(t) is a decreasing function of t.
Proof: We examine the derivative of φi(t); we need expressions for the derivatives of the adjoint functions towards that
end. From (10), (11), at any t at which u is continuous, we have:
λ˙Si =− ∂L(R)
∂Ri
− (λIi − λSi )
M∑
j=1
βjiIj + λ
S
i
M∑
j=1
β¯jiR
0
juj ,
λ˙Ii =−
M∑
j=1
(
(λIj − λSj )βijSj
)
+ λIi
M∑
j=1
pijiβ¯jiR
0
juj − ∂L(R)
∂Ri
− ∂f(I)
∂Ii
. (17)
Using (16), (17) and some reassembly of terms, at any t at which u is continuous,
φ˙i(t) = −
M∑
j=1
β¯ij
[
Sj
∂L(R)
∂Rj
+ piijIj
(
∂L(R)
∂Rj
+
∂f(I)
∂Ij
)
+
M∑
k=1
(1 + piij)λ
I
jβkjSjIk +
M∑
k=1
piijIjSkβjk(λ
I
k − λSk )
]
.
The assumptions on L(·) and f(·) (together with Theorem 1) show that the first two terms inside the square brackets on the
right are always non-negative. Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 (together with our assumptions on piij , βij and β¯ij) show that the
penultimate term is positive for t > 0 and the final term is non-negative. It follows that φ˙i(t) < 0 for every t ∈ (0, T ) at
which u(t) is continuous. As φi(t) is a continuous function of time and its derivative is negative except at a finite number of
points (where u may be discontinuous), it follows indeed that, as advertised, φi(t) is a decreasing function of time.
B. Structure of optimal non-replicative patching
We are now ready to identify the structures of the optimal controls (u1(t), . . . , uM (t)):
Theorem 2. Predicated on the existence of an optimal control, for types i such that R0i > 0: if hi(·) is concave, then the
optimal control for type i has the following structure: ui(t) = 1 for 0 < t < ti, and ui(t) = 0 ti < t ≤ T , where ti ∈ [0, T ).
If hi(·) is strictly convex then the optimal control for type i, ui(t) is continuous and has the following structure: ui(t) = 1
for 0 < t < t1i , ui(t) = 0 for t
2
i < t ≤ T , and ui(t) strictly decreases in the interval [t1i , t2i ], where 0 ≤ t1i < t2i ≤ T.
8Notice that if R0i = 0 in (2), the control ui is irrelevant and can take any arbitrary admissible value. Intuitively, at the onset
of the epidemic, a large fraction of nodes are susceptible to the malware (“potential victims”). Bandwidth and power resources
should hence be used maximally in the beginning (in all types), rendering as many infective and susceptible nodes robust
against the malware as possible. In particular, there is no gain in deferring patching since the efficacy of healing infective
nodes is less than that of immunizing susceptible nodes (recall that piij ≤ 1). While the non-increasing nature of the optimal
control is intuitive, what is less apparent is the characteristics of the decrease, which we establish in this theorem. For concave
hi(·), nodes are patched at the maximum possible rate until a time instant when patching stops abruptly, while for strictly
convex hi(·), this decrease is continuous. It is instructive to note that the structure of the optimal action taken by a type only
depends on its own patching cost and not on that of its neighbours. This is somewhat counter-intuitive as the controls for
one type affect the infection and recovery of other types. The timing of the decrease in each type differs and depends on the
location of the initial infection as well as the topology of the network, communication rates, etc.
Proof: For non-linear concave hi(·), (14) requires the minimization of the (non-linear concave) difference between a
non-linear concave function of a scalar variable x and a linear function of x at all time instants; hence the minimum can
only occur at the end-points of the interval over which x can vary. Thus all that needs to be done is to compare the values
of ψi(x, t) for the following two candidates: x = 0 and x = 1. Note that ψi(0, t) = 0 at all time instants and ψi(1, t) is a
function of time t. Let
γi(t) := ψi(1, t) = R
0
i hi(1)−R0iφi(t). (18)
Then the optimal ui satisfies the following condition:
ui(t) =
{
1 γi(t) < 0
0 γi(t) > 0
(19)
From the transversality conditions in (12) and the definition of φi(t) in (16), for all i, it follows that φi(T ) = 0. From the
definition of the cost term, hi(1) > 0, hence, since R0i > 0, therefore γi(T ) > 0. Thus the structure of the optimal control
predicted in the theorem for the strictly concave case will follow from (19) if we can show that γi(t) is an increasing function
of time t, as that implies that it can be zero at most at one point ti, with γi(t) < 0 for t < ti and γi(t) > 0 for t > ti. From
(18), γi will be an increasing function of time if φi is a decreasing function of time, a property which we showed in Lemma
2.
If hi(·) is linear (i.e., hi(x) = Kix, Ki > 0, since hi(x) > 0 for x > 0), ψi(x, t) = R0i x(Ki − φi(t)) and from (14), the
condition for an optimal ui is:
ui(t) =
{
1 φi(t) > Ki
0 φi(t) < Ki
(20)
But from (12), φi(T ) = 0 < Ki and as by Lemma 2, φi(t) is decreasing, it follows that φi(t) will be equal to Ki at most at
one time instant t = ti, with φi(t) > 0 for t < ti and φi(t) < 0 for t > ti. This, along with (20), concludes the proof of the
theorem for the concave case.
We now consider the case where hi(·) is strictly convex. In this case, the minimization in (14) may also be attained at an
interior point of [0, 1] (besides 0 and 1) at which the partial derivative of the right hand side with respect to x is zero. Hence,
ui(t) =

1 1 < η(t)
η(t) 0 < η(t) ≤ 1
0 η(t) ≤ 0.
(21)
where η(t) is such that
dhi(x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
(x=η(t))
= φi(t).
Note that φi(t) is a continuous function due to the continuity of the states and adjoint functions. We showed that it is also
a decreasing function of time (Lemma 2). Since hi(·) is double differentiable, its first derivative is continuous, and since it
is strictly convex, its derivative is a strictly increasing function of its argument. Therefore, η(t) must be a continuous and
decreasing function of time, as per the predicted structure.
9C. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: From (17) and (12), at time T we have:
λIi |t=T = (λIi − λSi )|t=T = 0,
lim
t↑T
λ˙Ii = −
∂L(R)
∂Ri
(T )− ∂f(I)
∂Ii
(T ) < 0
lim
t↑T
(λ˙Ii − λ˙Si ) = −
∂f(I)
∂Ii
(T ) < 0
Hence, ∃  > 0 s.t. λIi > 0 and (λIi − λSi ) > 0 over (T − , T ).
Now suppose that, going backward in time from t = T , (at least) one of the inequalities is first violated at t = t∗ for i∗,
i.e., for all i, λIi (t) > 0 and (λ
I
i (t)− λSi (t)) > 0 for all t > t∗ and either (A) (λIi∗(t∗)− λSi∗(t∗)) = 0 or (B) λIi∗(t∗) = 0 for
some i = i∗. Note that from continuity of the adjoint functions λIi (t
∗) ≥ 0 and (λIi (t∗)− λSi (t∗)) ≥ 0 for all i.
We investigate case (A) first. We have:6,7
(λ˙Ii∗ − λ˙Si∗)(t∗+) =−
∂f(I)
∂Ii∗
−
M∑
j=1
[(λIj − λSj )βi∗jSj ]− λIi∗
M∑
j=1
β¯ji∗(1− piji∗)R0juj .
First of all, −∂f(I)/∂Ii∗ < 0. The other two terms are non-positive, due to the definition of t∗ and piij ≤ 1. Hence,
(λ˙Ii∗ − λ˙Si∗)(t∗+) < 0, which is in contradiction with Property 1 of real-valued functions, proved in [30]:
Property 1. Let g(t) be a continuous and piecewise differentiable function of t. If g(t0) = L and g(t) > L (g(t) < L) for all
t ∈ (t0, t1]. Then g˙(t+0 ) ≥ 0 (respectively g˙(t+0 ) ≤ 0).
On the other hand, for case (B) we have:7
λ˙Ii∗(t
∗+) = −∂L(R)
∂Ri∗
− ∂f(I)
∂Ii∗
−
M∑
j=1
[(λIj − λSj )βi∗jSj ],
which is negative since −∂L(R)/∂Ri∗ ≤ 0, −∂f(I)/∂Ii∗ < 0, and from the definition of t∗ (for the third term). This
contradicts Property 1 and the claim follows.
IV. OPTIMAL REPLICATIVE PATCHING
A. Numerical framework for computing the optimal controls
As in the non-replicative setting, we develop a numerical framework for calculation of the optimal solutions using PMP,
and then we establish the structure of the optimal controls.
For every control u˜, we define τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜) ∈ [0, T ] as follows: If Ri(0) > 0, and therefore Ri(t) > 0 for all t > 0
due to Theorem 1, we define τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜) to be 0. Else, τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜) is the maximum t for which Ri(t) = 0.
It follows from Theorem 1 that Ri(t) = 0 for all t ≤ τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜) and all i such that Ri(0) = 0, and Ri(t) > 0 for
all τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜) < t ≤ T . We begin with the hypothesis that there exists at least one optimal control, say u˜ ∈ U∗, and
construct a control u that chooses ui(t) := 0 for t ≤ τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜) and ui(t) := u˜i(t) for t > τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜).
Clearly, the states S(t), I(t),R(t) corresponding to u˜ also constitute the state functions for u, as the state equations only differ
at t = 0, a set of measure zero. Thus, u is also an optimal control, and τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜) = τi(I(0),S(0),R(0),u) for
each i. Henceforth, for notational convenience, we will refer to τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u˜), τi(I(0),S(0),R(0),u) as τi. Note that
the definition of this control completely specifies the values of each ui in [0, T ].
Referring to the integrand of (9) as ξrep and the RHS of equations (5a,b,c) as νi, µi and ρi the Hamiltonian becomes:
H = H(u) := ξrep +
M∑
i=1
[(λSi νi + λ
I
iµi + λ
R
i ρi), (22)
where the adjoint functions λSi , λ
I
i , λ
R
i are continuous functions that at each point of continuity of u(·) and for all i = 1 . . .M ,
satisfy
λ˙Si = −
∂H
∂Si
, λ˙Ii = −
∂H
∂Ii
, λ˙Ri = −
∂H
∂Ri
, (23)
with the final constraints:
λSi (T ) = λ
I
i (T ) = λ
R
i (T ) = 0. (24)
6 g(t+0 ) := limt↓t0 g(t) and g(t
−
0 ) := limt↑t0 g(t).
7The RHS of the equation is evaluated at t = t∗ due to continuity.
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According to PMP, any optimal controller must satisfy:
u ∈ arg min
v
H(v), (25)
where the minimization is over the set of admissible controls.
Using the expressions for ξrep from (9) and the expressions for νi, µi and ρi from (5), it can be shown that the vector
minimization (25) can be expressed as a scalar minimization
ui(t) ∈ arg min
0≤x≤1
ψi(x, t) (1 ≤ i ≤M); (26)
ψi(x, t) : = Ri(t)(hi(x)− φi(t)x); (27)
φi :=
M∑
j=1
β¯ij(λ
S
j − λRj )Sj +
M∑
j=1
piij β¯ij(λ
I
j − λRj )Ij . (28)
Equation (26) characterizes the optimal control ui as a function of the state and adjoint functions at each instant. Plugging
the optimal ui into the state and adjoint function equations (respectively (5) and (23)) will again leave us with a system of
(non-linear) differential equations that involves only the state and adjoint functions (and not the control u(·)), the initial values
of the states (6) and the final values of the adjoint functions (24). Similar to the non-replicative case, the optimal controls may
now be obtained (via (26)) by solving the above system of differential equations.
We conclude this subsection by stating and proving some important properties of the adjoint functions (Lemma 3 below)
and φi(·) (Lemma 4 subsequently), which we use later.
First, from (24), ψi(0, t) = 0, hence (26) results in ψi(ui, t) ≤ 0. Furthermore, from the definition of τi, if t ≤ τi,
(hi(ui(t))− φi(t)ui(t)) = 0, and if t > τi, (hi(ui(t))− φi(t)ui(t)) = ψi(ui, t)
Ri(t)
≤ 0, so for all t,
αi(ui, t) := (hi(ui(t))− φi(t)ui(t)) ≤ 0. (29)
Lemma 3. For all t ∈ [0, T ) and for all i, we have (λIi − λSi ) > 0 and (λIi − λRi ) > 0.
Using our previous intuitive analogy, Lemma 3 implies that infective nodes are always worse for the evolution of the system
than either susceptible or healed nodes, and thus the marginal price of infectives is greater than that of susceptible and healed
nodes at all times before T . As before, we defer the proof of this lemma (to §IV-C) to avoid breaking up the flow of the
narrative. We now state and prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. For each i, φi(t) is a decreasing function of t, and φ˙i(t+) < 0 and φ˙i(t−) < 0 for all t.
Proof: φi(t) is continuous everywhere (due to the continuity of the states and adjoint functions) and differentiable whenever
u(·) is continuous. At any t at which u(·) is continuous, we have:
φ˙i(t) =
M∑
j=1
β¯ij [(λ˙
S
j − λ˙Rj )Sj + (λSj − λRj )S˙j + piij(λ˙Ij − λ˙Rj )Ij + piij(λIj − λRj )I˙j ].
From (22) and the adjoint equations (23), at points of continuity of the control, we have:
λ˙Si =− (λIi − λSi )
M∑
j=1
βjiIj − (λRi − λSi )
M∑
j=1
β¯jiRjuj ,
λ˙Ii =− ∂f(I)
∂Ii
−
M∑
j=1
(λIj − λSj )βijSj − (λRi − λIi )
M∑
j=1
pijiβ¯jiRjuj ,
λ˙Ri =
∂L(R)
∂Ri
+ ui
M∑
j=1
β¯ij(λ
S
j − λRj )Sj + ui
M∑
j=1
piij β¯ij(λ
I
j − λRj )Ij − hi(ui) = ∂L(R)
∂Ri
− αi(ui, t). (30)
Therefore, after some regrouping and cancellation of terms, at any t, we have
−φ˙i(t+) =
M∑
j=1
β¯ij [(1− piij)
M∑
k=1
(λIj − λRj )βkjIkSj + piij ∂f(I)
∂Ij
Ij + (Sj + piijIj)(
∂L(R)
∂Rj
− αi(ui, t)) + piijIj
M∑
k=1
(λIk − λSk )βjkSk].
Now, since 0 ≤ piij ≤ 1, the assumptions on β¯ij , βki and βil, Theorem 1, and Lemma 3 all together imply that the sum of
the first and last terms of the RHS will be positive. The second and third terms will be non-negative due to the definitions of
f(·) and L(·) and (29). So φ˙i(t+) < 0 for all t. The proof for φ˙i(t−) < 0 is exactly as above. In a very similar fashion, it
can be proved that φ˙i(t) < 0 at all points of continuity of u(·), which coupled with the continuity of φi(t) shows that it is a
decreasing function of time.
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B. Structure of optimal replicative dispatch
Theorem 3. If an optimal control exists, for types i such that Ri(t) > 0 for some t: if hi(·) is concave for type i, the optimal
control for type i has the following structure: ui(t) = 1 for 0 < t < ti, and ui(t) = 0 for ti < t ≤ T , where ti ∈ [0, T ).
If hi(·) is strictly convex, the optimal control for type i, ui(t) is continuous and has the following structure: ui(t) = 1 for
0 < t < t1i , ui(t) = 0 for t
2
i < t ≤ T , and ui(t) strictly decreases in the interval [t1i , t2i ], where 0 ≤ t1i < t2i ≤ T.
Notice that for i such that Ri(t) = 0 for all t, the control ui(t) is irrelevant and can take any arbitrary value. We first prove
the theorem for t ∈ [τi, T ], and then we show that τi ∈ {0, T}, completing our proof.
Proof: First consider an i such that hi(·) is concave and non-linear. Note that hence ψi(x, t) is a non-linear concave function
of x. Thus, the minimum can only occur at extremal values of x, i.e., x = 0 and x = 1. Now ψi(0, t) = 0 at all times t, so to
obtain the structure of the control, we need to examine ψi(1, t) at each t > τi. Let γi(t) := ψi(1, t) = Ri(t)(hi(1) − φi(t))
be a function of time t. From (26), the optimal ui satisfies:
ui(t) =
{
1 γi(t) < 0,
0 γi(t) > 0.
(31)
We now show that γi(t) > 0 for an interval (ti, T ] for some ti, and γi(t) < 0 for [τi, ti) if ti > τi. From (24) and (28),
γi(T ) = hi(1)Ri(T ) > 0. Since γi(t) is a continuous function of its variable (due to the continuity of the states and adjoint
functions), it will be positive for a non-zero interval leading up to t = T . If γi(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [τi, T ], the theorem follows.
Otherwise, from continuity, there must exist a t = ti > τi such that γi(ti) = 0. We show that for t > ti, γi(t) > 0, from
which it follows that γi(t) < 0 for t < ti (by a contradiction argument). The theorem will then follow from (31).
Towards establishing the above, we show that γ˙i(t+) > 0 and γ˙i(t−) > 0 for any t such that γi(t) = 0. Hence, there will
exist an interval (ti, ti+ ) over which γi(t) > 0. If ti+  ≥ T , then the claim holds, otherwise there exists a t = ti′ > ti such
that γi(ti
′
) = 0 and γi(t) 6= 0 for ti < t < t′i (from the continuity of γi(t)). So γ˙i(ti
′−) > 0, which contradicts a property of
real-valued functions (proved in [30]), establishing the claim:
Property 2. If g(x) is a continuous and piecewise differentiable function over [a, b] such that g(a) = g(b) while g(x) 6= g(a)
for all x in (a, b), dgdx (a
+) and dgdx (b
−) cannot be positive simultaneously.
We now show that γ˙i(t+) > 0 and γ˙i(t−) > 0 for any t > τi such that γi(t) = 0. Due to the continuity of γi(t) and the
states, and the finite number of points of discontinuity of the controls, for any t > τi we have:
γ˙i(t
+) = (R˙i(t
+)
γi(t)
Ri(t)
−Ri(t)φ˙i(t+)) (32)
γ˙i(t
−) = (R˙i(t−)
γi(t)
Ri(t)
−Ri(t)φ˙i(t−)). (33)
If γi(t) = 0, then γ˙i(t+) = −Ri(t)φ˙i(t+) and γ˙i(t−) = −Ri(t)φ˙i(t−), which are both positive from Lemma 4 and Theorem
1, and thus the theorem follows.
The proofs for linear and strictly convex hi(·)’s are virtually identical to the corresponding parts of the proof of Theorem 2
and are omitted for brevity; the only difference is that in the linear case we need to replace R0i with Ri(t). The following
lemma, proved in §IV-D, completes the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 5. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ B, τi ∈ {0, T}.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: First, from (28) and (24), we have φi(T ) = 0, which, combined with (27) results in ψi(x, T ) = Ri(T )hi(x). Since
either Ri(T ) > 0 or τi > T , (26) and the definition of ui result in ui(T ) = 0, as all other values of x would produce a positive
ψi(x, T ). Therefore, hi(ui(T )) = 0.
The rest of the proof has a similar structure to that of Lemma 1. (λIi −λSi )|t=T = 0 and limt↑T (λ˙Ii −λ˙Si ) = −∂f(I)/∂Ii < 0,
for all i. Also, for all i, (λIi − λRi )|t=T = 0 and limt↑T (λ˙Ii − λ˙Ri ) = −∂f(I)/∂Ii − ∂L(R)/∂Ri + hi(ui(T )) < 0, since
hi(ui(T )) = 0.
Hence, ∃  > 0 such that (λIi − λSi ) > 0 and (λIi − λRi ) > 0 over (T − ′, T ).
Now suppose that (at least) one of the inequalities is first8 violated at t = t∗ for i∗, i.e., for all i, (λIi (t)− λSi (t)) > 0 and
(λIi (t)− λRi (t)) > 0 for all t > t∗, and either (A) (λIi∗(t∗)− λSi∗(t∗)) = 0, or (B) (λIi∗(t∗)− λRi∗(t∗)) = 0 for some i∗. Note
that from continuity of the adjoint functions, (λIi (t
∗)− λSi (t∗)) ≥ 0, and (λIi (t∗)− λRi (t∗)) ≥ 0 for all i.
8Going backward in time from t = T .
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Case (A): Here, we have:9
(λ˙Ii∗ − λ˙Si∗)(t∗+) =−
∂f(I)
∂Ii∗
−
M∑
j=1
(λIj − λSj )βi∗jSj − (λIi∗ − λRi∗)
M∑
j=1
β¯ji∗(1− piji∗)Rjuj .
First of all, −∂f(I)/∂Ii∗ < 0. Also, the second and third terms are non-positive, according to the definition of t∗. Hence,
(λ˙Ii∗ − λ˙Si∗)(t∗+) < 0, which contradicts Property 1, therefore case (A) does not arise.
Case (B): In this case, we have:9
(λ˙Ii∗ − λ˙Ri∗)(t∗+) =−
∂f(I)
∂Ii∗
− ∂L(R)
∂Ri∗
−
M∑
j=1
(λIj − λSj )βi∗jSj + αi∗(ui∗ , t).
We have −∂f(I)/∂Ii∗ < 0 and −∂L(R)/∂Ri∗ ≤ 0. The term −(λIi∗ − λSi∗)
∑M
j=1 βji∗Sj is non-positive, according to the
definition of t∗, and αi∗ will be non-negative due to (29). This shows (λ˙Ii∗ − λ˙Ri∗)(t∗+) < 0, contradicting Property 1, and so
case (B) does not arise either, completing the proof.
D. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: We start by creating another control u¯ from u such that for every i, for every t ≤ τi, u¯i(t) := 1, and for every
t > τi, u¯i(t) := ui(t). We prove by contradiction that τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u¯) ∈ {0, T} for each i. Since u¯i 6≡ ui only
in [0, τi] and Ri(t) = 0 for t ∈ (0, τi] when u is used, the state equations can only differ at a solitary point t = 0, and
therefore both controls result in the same state evolutions. Thus, for each i, τi(I(0),S(0),R(0), u¯) = τi(I(0),S(0),R(0),u),
and τi(I(0),S(0), u¯) may be denoted as τi as well. The lemma therefore follows.
For the contradiction argument, assume that the control is u¯ and that τi ∈ (0, T ) for some i. Our proof relies on the fact
that if u¯i(t′) = 0 at some t′ ∈ (0, T ), then u¯i(t) = 0 for t > t′, which follows from the definition of u¯ and prior results in
the proof of Theorem 3.
For t ∈ [0, τi], since Ri(t) = 0 in this interval, (5c) becomes R˙i =
∑M
j=1,j 6=i β¯ji(Si+pijiIi)Rj u¯j = 0 in this interval. Since
all terms in
∑M
j=1,j 6=i β¯ji(Si + pijiIi)Rj u¯j are non-negative, for each j 6= i we must either have (i) β¯ji(Si(t) + pijiIi(t)) = 0
for some t ∈ [0, τi], or (ii) Rj(t)u¯j(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, τi].
(i) Here, either β¯ji = 0; or (Si(t) + pijiIi(t)) = 0, and hence due to Theorem 1, Si(t) = 0 and pijiIi(t) = 0. In the latter
case, from Theorem 1, Si(0) = 0 and piji = 0. and therefore for all t > 0, we will have β¯ji(Si + pijiIi)Rj u¯j = 0.
(ii) We can assume β¯ji(Si(t) + pijiIi(t)) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, τi]. For such j, if τj < τi, Rj(t) > 0 for t ∈ (τj , τi], therefore
u¯j(t) = 0 for such t. Due to the structure results obtained for the interval [τj , T ] in Theorem 3, u¯j(t) = 0 for all t > τj , and
therefore β¯ji(Si + pijiIi)Rj u¯j = 0 for all t > 0.
Now, since M < ∞, the set W = {τk : τk > 0, k = 1, . . . ,M} must have a minimum ω0 < T . Let L(ω0) = {k ∈
{1, . . . ,M} : τk = ω0}. Let the second smallest element in W be ω1. Using the above argument, the values of Rk(t) for
t ∈ [ω0, ω1] for all k ∈ L(ω0) would affect each other, but not Ri’s for i such that τi > 0, i 6∈ L(ω0). Furthermore, in this
interval for k ∈ L(ω0) we have R˙k =
∑
g∈L(ω0) β¯gk(Sg + pigkIi)Rgu¯g , with Rk(ω0) = 0. We see that for all k ∈ L(ω0),
replacing Rk(t) = 0 in the RHS of equation (5) gives us R˙k(t) = 0, a compatible LHS, while not compromising the existence
of solutions for all other states. An application of Theorem 1 for t ∈ [ω0, ω1] and u¯ shows that this is the unique solution of
the system of differential equations (5). This contradicts the definition of τk, completing the proof of the lemma.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE COST FUNCTIONAL
Recall that in our objective function, the cost of non-replicative patching was defined as
∑M
i=1R
0
i hi(ui) (respectively∑M
i=1Rihi(ui) for the replicative case), which corresponds to a scenario in which the dispatchers are charged for every instant
they are immunizing/healing (distributing the patch), irrespective of the number of nodes they are delivering patches to. This
represents a broadcast cost model where each transmission can reach all nodes of the neighbouring types. In an alternative
unicast scenario, different transmissions may be required to deliver the patches to different nodes. This model is particularly
useful if the dispatchers may only transmit to the nodes that have not yet received the patch.10 Hence, the cost of patching in
this case can be represented by:
∑M
i=1
∑M
j=1R
0
i β¯ij(Sj + Ij)p(ui) (for the replicative case:
∑M
i=1
∑M
j=1Riβ¯ij(Sj + Ij)p(ui)),
where p(.) is an increasing function. More generally, the patching cost can be represented as a sum of the previously seen
cost (§II-E) and this term.
9The RHS of the equation is evaluated at t = t∗ due to continuity.
10This can be achieved by keeping a common database of nodes that have successfully received the patch, or by implementing a turn-taking algorithm
preventing double targeting. Note that we naturally assume that the network does not know with a priori certainty which nodes are infective, and hence
it cannot differentiate between susceptibles and infectives. Consequently, even when piij = 0, i.e., the system manager knows the patch cannot remove the
infection and can only immunize the susceptible, still the best it may be able to do is to forward the message to any node that has not yet received it.
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For non-replicative patching, if all hi(·) and p(·) are concave, then Theorem 2 will hold if for all pairs (i, j), piij = pij (i.e.,
healing efficacy only depends on the type of an infected node, not that of the immunizer). The analysis will change in the
following ways: A term of R0i p(ui)
∑M
j=1 β¯ij(Sj+Ij) is added to (15), and subsequently to (18) (with ui = 1 in the latter case).
Also, (17) is modified by the subtraction of
∑M
j=1 β¯jiR
0
jp(uj) from the RHS of both equations. This leaves λ˙
I
i − λ˙Si untouched,
while subtracting a positive amount from λ˙Ii , meaning that Lemma 1 still holds. As φi(t) was untouched, this means that Lemma
2 will also hold. Thus the RHS of γ˙i is only modified by the subtraction of
∑M
j,k=1 β¯ij(Sj + pijIj)β¯kjR
0
k (p(uk)− ukp(1))
which is a positive term, as for any continuous, increasing, concave function p(·) such that p(0) = 0, we have ap(b) ≥ bp(a)
if a ≥ b ≥ 0, since p(x)x is increasing. This yields: (p(uk)− ukp(1) ≥ 0). Therefore the conclusion of Theorem 2 holds.
Similarly, it may be shown that Theorem 2 also holds for strictly convex hi(·) provided p(·) is linear.
For the replicative case, if p(·) is linear (p(x) = Cx) and again piij = pij for all (i, j), Theorem 3 will hold. The modifications
of the integrand and ψi are as above. The adjoint equations (30) are modified by the subtraction of
∑M
j=1 Cβ¯jiRjuj from λ˙
I
i
and λ˙Ii , and the subtraction of Cui
∑M
j=1 β¯ij(Sj + Ij) from λ˙
R
i . Due to the simultaneous change in ψi, however, we still have
λ˙Ri = ∂L(R)/∂Ri − αi(ui, t). Therefore, Lemma 3 still holds, as λ˙Ii − λ˙Si is unchanged, and a positive amount is subtracted
from λ˙Ii − λ˙Ri . We absorb
∑M
j=1 Cβ¯ij(Sj + Ij) into φi(t), where all the p(·) terms in φ˙i will cancel out, leaving the rest of
the analysis, including for Lemmas 4 and 5, to be the same. The theorem follows.
VI. NUMERICAL INVESTIGATIONS
In this section, we numerically investigate the optimal control policies for a range of malware and network parameters.11
Recalling the notion of topologies presented in §II-A (in the paragraph before (2)), we consider three topologies: linear, star
and complete, as was illustrated in Fig. 1. In our simulations, we assume that at t = 0, only one of the regions (types) is
infected, i.e., I0i > 0 only for i = 1. Also, R
0
i = 0.2, βii = β = 0.223 for all i.
12 The value of βij , i 6= j is equal to XCoef ·β
if link ij is part of the topology graph, and zero otherwise. (Unless otherwise stated, we use XCoef = 0.1.) It should be noted
that βij ∗ T denotes the average number of contacts between nodes of regions i and j within the time period, and thus β and
T are dependent variables. For simplicity, we use equal values for βji, βij , β¯ij , β¯ji for all i, j (i.e., βji = βij = β¯ij = β¯ji),
and set piij = pi for all i, j. We examine two different aggregate cost structures for non-replicative patching:13 (type-A)-∫ T
0
(
KI
∑M
i=1 Ii(t) +Ku
∑M
i=1R
0
i ui(t)
)
dt and (type-B)-
∫ T
0
(
KI
∑M
i=1 Ii(t) +Ku
∑M
i=1R
0
i ui(t)(Si(t) + Ii(t))
)
dt (de-
scribed in §II-E and §V respectively). We select T = 35, KI = 1, Ku = 0.5 unless stated otherwise. For replicative patching,
R0i in both cost types is replaced with Ri(t).
We first present an example of our optimal policy (§VI-1), and then we examine its behaviour in the linear and star topologies
(§VI-2). Subsequently, we show the cost improvements it achieves over heuristics (§VI-3). Finally, we demonstrate the relative
benefits of replicative patching (§VI-4).
Fig. 2. Optimal patching policies and corresponding levels of infection in a three region linear topology. Note how the infection that initially only exists in
region 1 spreads in region 1 and then to region 2, and finally to region 3.
11For our calculations, we use a combination of C programming and PROPT R©, by Tomlab Optimization Inc for MATLAB R©.
12This specific value of β is chosen to match the average inter-meeting times from the numerical experiment reported in [31].
13fi(·), hi(·), and p(·) are linear and identical for all i, and li(·) = 0.
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1) Numeric Example: First, with the intention of illustrating our analytical results, in Fig. 2 we have depicted an example
of the optimal dynamic patching policy along with the corresponding evolution of the infection as a function of time for a
simple 3-region linear topology where the infection starts in region 1 (I0 = (0.3, 0, 0)). The cost model is type-A and patching
is non-replicative. For pi = 0 the levels of infection are non-decreasing, whereas for pi = 1 they may go down as well as up
(due to healing).
2) Effects of Topology: We study the drop-off times (the time thresholds at which the bang-bang optimal patching halts) in
different regions for linear and star topologies.
Fig. 3 reveals two different patterns for pi = 0 and pi = 1 in a linear topology with 10 regions with non-replicative patching
and type-A cost. For pi = 0, a middle region is patched for the longest time, whereas for pi = 1, as we move away from the
origin of the infection (region 1), the drop-off point decreases. This is because for pi = 0, patching can only benefit the network
by recovering susceptibles. In regions closer to the origin, the fraction of susceptibles decreases quickly, making continuation
of the patching comparatively less beneficial. In the middle regions, where there are more salvageable susceptibles, patching
should be continued for longer. For regions far from the origin, patching can be stopped earlier, as the infection barely reaches
them within the time horizon of consideration. For pi = 1, patching is able to recover both susceptible and infective nodes.
Hence, the drop-off times depend only on the exposure to the infection, which decreases with distance from the origin. As
XCoef is increased, the drop-off points when pi = 1 get closer together. Intuitively, this is because higher cross-mixing rates
have a homogenizing effect, as the levels of susceptible and infective nodes in different region rapidly become comparable.
Also, Fig. 3 reveals that as XCoef increases and more infection reaches farther regions, they are patched for longer, which
agrees with our intuition.
Fig. 3. Drop-off times in a linear topology for XCoef = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6.
We next investigate a star configuration where the infection starts from a peripheral region (region 1), cost is type-B, patching
is non-replicative, and I01 = 0.6. Fig. 4 reveals the following interesting phenomenon: although the central region is the only
one that is connected to all the regions, for pi = 0, it is patched for shorter lengths of time compared to the peripherals. In
retrospect, this is because only susceptible nodes can be patched and their number at the central region drops quickly due
to its interactions with all the peripheral regions, rendering patching inefficient relatively swiftly. As expected, this effect is
amplified with higher numbers of peripheral regions. For pi = 1, on the other hand, the central region is patched for the longest
time. This is because the infective nodes there can infect susceptible nodes in all regions, and hence the patching, which can
now heal the infectives as well, does not stop until it heals almost all of infective nodes in this region.
Fig. 4. Drop-off times in the star topology.
3) Cost Comparison: Next, in order to evaluate the efficacy of our dynamic heterogeneous patching policy, we compare our
aggregate cost against those of four alternative patching policies. We label our policy as Stratified Dynamic. In the simplest
alternative policy, all regions use identical patching intensities that do not change with time. We then select this fixed and static
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level of patching so as to minimize the aggregate cost among all possible choices. We refer to this policy as Static (St.). The
aggregate cost may be reduced if the static value of the patching is allowed to be distinct for different regions. These values
(still fixed over time) are then independently varied and the best combination is selected. We refer to this policy as Stratified
Static (S. St.). The third policy we implement is a homogeneous approximation to the heterogeneous network. Specifically,
the whole network is approximated by a single region model with an equivalent inter-contact rate. This value is selected such
that the average pairwise contact rates are equal in both systems. The optimal control is derived based on this model and
applied across all regions to calculate the aggregate cost. We call this policy Simplified Homogeneous (S. H.). The simplified
homogeneous policy is a special case of Spatially Static (Sp. St.) policies, where a one one-jump bang-bang control is applied
to all regions to find the optimum uniform control.
Fig. 5 depicts the aggregate costs of all five policies for a linear topology with M = 2, . . . , 5 regions. The cost is type-A
and patching is replicative, with pi = 1. Here, I01 = 0.2, Ku = 0.2 and the rest of parameters are as before. As we can
clearly observe, our stratified policy achieves the least cost, outperforming the rest. When the number of regions is small, H.
and Sp. St. perform better than S. St., all of which obviously outperform St. However, as the number of regions increases
and the network becomes more spatially heterogeneous, the homogeneous approximation, and all uniform controls in general,
worsen and the S. St. policy quickly overtakes them as the best approximation to the optimal. For example for M = 5 regions,
our policy outperforms the best static policies by 40% and the homogeneous approximation by 100%, which shows that our
results about the structure of the optimal control can result in large cost improvements. For pi = 0, a similar performance gap
is observed. Specifically, as discussed, optimal drop-off times for this problem should vary based on the distance from the
originating region, a factor that the Sp. St., H., and St. policies ignore.
Fig. 5. Cost of heuristics vs. the optimal policy, linear topology.
4) Replicative vs. Non-replicative Patching: As previously stated, any solution to the non-replicative patching problem can
be emulated by replicative patching, making this scenario worth investigation, even with the additional security vulnerabilities
that the system has to contend with. In Fig. 6, we see the aggregate cost of optimal replicative and non-replicative patching
in a complete topology as a function of the size of the network for M ≤ 11, pi = 1, and Ku = 0.2. Here, even for such
modest sizes, replicative patching can be 60% more efficient than non-replicative patching, a significant improvement. This is
especially true for the complete topology and other edge-dense topologies, as in replicative patching, the patch can spread in
ways akin to the malware.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We considered the problem of disseminating security patches in a large resource-constrained heterogeneous network in the
mean-field regime. Using tools from optimal control theory, we analytically proved that optimal dynamic policies for each type
of node follow simple threshold-based structures. We numerically demonstrated the advantage of our heterogeneous policies
over homogeneous approximations, as well as over static policies. For future research, we would like to further investigate the
effects of heterogeneities in the structure of networks on both defense and attack strategies.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We use the following general result :
Lemma 6. Suppose the vector-valued function f = (fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3M) has component functions given by quadratic forms
fi(t,x) = x
TQi(t)x+pi
Tx (t ∈ [0, T ]; x ∈ S), where S is the set of 3M -dimensional vectors x = (x1, . . . , x3M ) satisfying
x ≥ 0 and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,M};xj + xM+j + x2M+j = 1, Qi(t) is a matrix whose components are uniformly, absolutely
bounded over [0, T ], as are the elements of the vector pi. Then, for an 3M -dimensional vector-valued function F, the system
of differential equations
F˙ = f(t,F) (0 < t ≤ T )
subject to initial conditions F(0) ∈ S (34)
has a unique solution, F(t), which varies continuously with the initial conditions F0 ∈ S at each t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: This lemma is virtually identical to Lemma 1 of [32] for N = 3M , with the difference that here fi(t,x) has
an additive piTx term. Thus, we will only list the changes: As the Euclidean norm ‖Qi(t)x‖ is uniformly bounded over
(t,x) ∈ [0, T ] × S, there exists C < ∞ such that sup[0,T ]×S ‖Qi(t)x‖ ≤ C. Also, ‖pi‖ ≤ H for some H < ∞ as all its
elements are bounded. Now, for each t, we may write
fi(t,x)− fi(t,y) =
(
Qi(t)x+ pi
)T
(x− y) + (x− y)TQi(t)y
Taking absolute values of both sides, we obtain
|fi(t,x)− fi(t,y)| ≤
∣∣(Qi(t)x)T (x− y)∣∣+ ∣∣(x− y)TQi(t)y∣∣+ ∣∣piT (x− y)∣∣ ≤ (2C +H)‖x− y‖ (t ∈ [0, T ]; x,y ∈ S),
by using the triangle and Cauchy-Schwarz inequalities. Hence
‖f(t,x)− f(t,y)‖ ≤ L ‖x− y‖ (t ∈ [0, T ]; x,y ∈ S),
and so f(t, ·) is Lipschitz over S where the Lipschitz constant L = (2C +H)√3M may be chosen uniformly for t ∈ [0, T ].
The rest of the proof is exactly as in [32].
Proof of Theorem 1: We write F(0) = F0, and in a slightly informal notation, F = F(t) = F(t,F0) to acknowledge the
dependence of F on the initial value F0.
We first verify that S(t) + I(t) + R(t) = 1 for all t in both cases. By summing the left and right sides of the system
of equations (2) and the R˙i equation that was left out (respectively the two sides of equations (5)), we see that in both
cases for all i,
(
S˙i(t) + I˙i(t) + R˙i(t)
)
= 0, and, in view of the initial normalization
(
Si(0) + Ii(0) + Ri(0)
)
= 1, we have(
Si(t) + Ii(t) +Ri(t)
)
= 1 for all t and all i.
We now verify the non-negativity condition. Let F = (F1, . . . , F3M ) be the state vector in 3M dimensions whose elements
are comprised of (Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ M), (Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ M) and (Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ M) in some order. The system of equations (2) can
thus be represented as F˙ = f(t,F), where for t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ S, the vector-valued function f = (fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3M) has
component functions fi(t,x) = xTQi(t)x + piTx in which (i) Qi(t) is a matrix whose non-zero elements are of the form
±βjk, (ii) the elements of pi(t) are of the form ±β¯jkR0juj and ±β¯jkpijkR0juj , whereas (5) can be represented in the same
form but with (i) Qi(t) having elements ±βjk, ±β¯jkuj , and ±β¯jkpijkuj , and (ii) pi = 0. Thus, the components of Qi(t)
are uniformly, absolutely bounded over [0, T ]. Lemma 6 establishes that the solution F(t,F0) to the systems (2) and (5) is
unique and varies continuously with the initial conditions F0; it clearly varies continuously with time. Next, using elementary
calculus, we show in the next paragraph that if F0 ∈ Int S (and, in particular, each component of F0 is positive), then each
component of the solution F(t,F0) of (2) and (5) is positive at each t ∈ [0, T ]. Since F(t,F0) varies continuously with F0,
therefore F(t,F0) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], F0 ∈ S, which completes the overall proof.
Accordingly, let the Si, Ii, and Ri component of F0 be positive. Since the solution F(t,F0) varies continuously with time,
there exists a time, say t′ > 0, such that each component of F(t,F0) is positive in the interval [0, t′). The result follows
trivially if t′ ≥ T . Suppose now that there exists t′′ < T such that each component of F(t,F0) is positive in the interval
[0, t′′), and at least one such component is 0 at t′′.
We first examine the non-replicative case. We show that such components can not be Si for any i and subsequently rule
out Ii and Ri for all i. Note that uj(t), Ij(t), Sj(t) are bounded in [0, t′′] (recall (Sj(t) + Ij(t) +Rj(t)) = 1, Sj(t) ≥
0, Ij(t) ≥ 0, Rj(t) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, t ∈ [0, t′′]). From (2a) Si(t′′) = Si(0)e−
∫ t′′
0
∑M
j=1(βjiIj(t)+β¯jiR
0
juj(t)) dt.
Since all uj(t), Ij(t) are bounded in [0, t′′], Si(0) > 0, R0j ≥ 0, and βji, β¯ji ≥ 0, therefore Si(t′′) > 0. Since Si(t) > 0,
Ii(t) ≥ 0 for all i, t ∈ [0, t′′], and βji ≥ 0, from (2b), I˙i ≥ −Ii
∑M
j=1 pijiβ¯jiR
0
juj for all i in the interval [0, t
′′]. Thus,
Ii(t
′′) ≥ Ii(0)e−
∫ t′′
0
∑M
j=1 piji(β¯jiR
0
juj(t)) dt. Since all uj(t), Ij(t), Sj(t) are bounded in [0, t′′], and Ii(0) > 0, β¯ji, piji ≥ 0, it
follows that Ii(t′′) > 0 for all i ≥ 0. Finally, Ri(t′′) > 0 because Ri(0) > 0 and R˙i(t) ≥ 0 from the above, so Ri(t) ≥ R0i ,
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and Si(t) + Ii(t) ≤ 1− R0i for all t and i. This contradicts the definition of t′′ and in turn implies that F(t,F0) > 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ], F0 ∈ Int S.
The proof for the replicative case is similar, with the difference that R0i is replaced with Ri, which is itself bounded.
Since the control and the unique state solution S(t), I(t) are non-negative, (2a, 5a) imply that S(t) is a non-increasing
function of time. Thus, Sj(t) = 0 if Sj(0) = 0 for any j. Using the argument in the above paragraph and starting from a
t′ ∈ [0, T ) where Sj(t′) > 0, Ij(t′) > 0, or Rj(t′) > 0, it may be shown respectively that Sj(t) > 0, Ij(t) > 0, and Rj(t) > 0
for all t > t′. All that remains to show now is:
Lemma 7. There exists  > 0 such that I(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, ).
Let d(i, j) be the distance from type j to type i (i.e., for all i, d(i, i) = 0 and for all pairs (i, j), d(i, j) = 1+ minimum
number of types in a path from type j to type i). Now, define d(i, U) := minj∈U d(i, j), where U := { i : I0i > 0 }. Since we
assumed that every type i is either in U or is connected to a type in U , d(i, U) < M for all types i.
Let δ > 0 be a time such that for all types i such that d(i, U) = 0 (the initially infected types), we have Ii(t) > 0 for
t ∈ [0, δ). Thus, proving Lemma 8 below will be equivalent to proving Lemma 7, given an appropriate scaling of δ.
Lemma 8. For all i and for all integers r ≥ 0, if d(i, U) ≤ r, then Ii(t) > 0 for t ∈ ( rM δ, T ).
Proof: By induction on r.
Base case: r = 0. If d(i, U) = 0, this means that the type is initially infected, and thus Ii(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, T ) by definition.
Therefore the base case holds.
Induction step: Assume that the statement holds for r = 0, . . . , k and consider r = k + 1. Since (k+1M δ, T ) ⊂ ( kM δ, T ),
we need to examine types i such that d(i, U) = k + 1. In equation (2b) at t = k+1M δ, the first sum on the right involves
terms like Ij(k+1M δ)Si(
k+1
M δ) where j is a neighbor of i, while the second sum involves terms like Ii(
k+1
M δ)uj(
k+1
M δ). Since
d(i, U) = k+1, there exist neighbours j of i such that d(j, U) = k, and therefore Ij(t) > 0 for t ∈ [k+1M δ, T ) (by the induction
hypothesis). Hence since S0i > 0 and βji > 0 (i and j being neighbours), for such t, I˙i(t) > −Ii(t)
∑M
j=1 pijiβ¯jiR
0
juj(t) ≥
−GIi(t), where G ≥ 0 is an upperbound on the sum (continuous functions are bounded on a closed and bounded interval).
Thus Ii(t) > Ii(k+1M δ)e
−Kt > 0, completing the proof for r = k + 1.
